Daily Papers

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products. However, designing effective recommender systems faces the key challenges: the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in securing incentive to explore new products against user's self-interested preferences. While prior work addresses Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) in fixed-design linear bandits (Sellke & Slivkins, 2023), we tackle the challenge of stochastic user covariates sampled online. Unlike standard black-box reductions (Mansour et al., 2020), our two-stage framework exploits the linear reward structure to achieve sublinear regret while satisfying incentive constraints. To address it, we propose a two-stage algorithm that integrates incentivized exploration with any efficient plug-in offline learning algorithms. In the first stage, it explores products while maintaining incentive compatibility to gather optimal samples. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling strategy (IPGS) integrated with any efficient learning methods to secure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that algorithm RCB achieves O(KdT) regret and simultaneously satisfies incentive constraints, and discovers the tradeoff between incentive budget and regret, validating in experiments. We demonstrate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through a real application on personalized warfarin dosing and simulations.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on reasoning benchmarks via reinforcement learning requires a specific reward function, often binary, for each benchmark. This comes with two potential limitations: the need to design the reward, and the potentially sparse nature of binary rewards. Here, we systematically investigate rewards derived from the probability or log-probability of emitting the reference answer (or any other prompt continuation present in the data), which have the advantage of not relying on specific verifiers and being available at scale. Several recent works have advocated for the use of similar rewards (e.g., VeriFree, JEPO, RLPR, NOVER). We systematically compare variants of likelihood-based rewards with standard baselines, testing performance both on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, and on long-form answers where no external verifier is available. We find that using the log-probability of the reference answer as the reward for chain-of-thought (CoT) learning is the only option that performs well in all setups. This reward is also consistent with the next-token log-likelihood loss used during pretraining. In verifiable settings, log-probability rewards bring comparable or better success rates than reinforcing with standard binary rewards, and yield much better perplexity. In non-verifiable settings, they perform on par with SFT. On the other hand, methods based on probability, such as VeriFree, flatline on non-verifiable settings due to vanishing probabilities of getting the correct answer. Overall, this establishes log-probability rewards as a viable method for CoT fine-tuning, bridging the short, verifiable and long, non-verifiable answer settings.

On-policy self-distillation has emerged as a promising paradigm for post-training language models, in which the model conditions on environment feedback to serve as its own teacher, providing dense token-level rewards without external teacher models or step-level annotations. Despite its empirical success, what this reward actually measures and what kind of credit it assigns remain unclear. Under a posterior-compatibility interpretation of feedback conditioning, standard in the implicit-reward literature, we show that the self-distillation token reward is a Bayesian filtering increment whose trajectory sum is exactly the pointwise mutual information between the response and the feedback given the input. This pMI can be raised by input-specific reasoning or by input-generic shortcuts, so we further decompose the teacher log-probability along the input axis. Based on this analysis, we propose CREDIT (Contrastive REward from DIsTillation), which isolates the input-specific component with a batch-contrastive baseline. At the sequence level, CREDIT is a teacher-side surrogate for a contrastive pMI objective that also penalizes responses remaining likely under unrelated inputs. Across coding, scientific reasoning, and tool-use benchmarks on two model families, CREDIT delivers the strongest aggregate performance at negligible additional compute.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

LLM agents increasingly rely on external inference conditions: prompts, tools, memory, SOPs, skills, and harness feedback. These assets can improve task execution without changing model weights, but they are often revised by heuristic reflection or by reusing observed successes and failures as if counts alone were reliable belief. We introduce Bayesian-Agent, a native and cross-harness framework that treats reusable skills and SOPs as hypotheses about whether a frozen model will succeed under a particular prompt, context, and harness environment. Bayesian-Agent records verified trajectory evidence, maintains a feature-conditioned categorical posterior over each skill, and maps posterior state into inspectable actions such as patch, split, compress, retire, and explore. Model-facing prompts receive executable guardrails and failure-mode patches, while posterior summaries remain available for audit. With deepseek-v4-flash, incremental repair improves SOP-Bench from 80\% to 95\%, Lifelong AgentBench from 90\% to 100\%, and RealFin-Bench from 45\% to 65\%. We further evaluate Bayesian-Agent's native backend and optional GenericAgent, mini-swe-agent, and Claude Code backends. The results include positive, negative, saturated, and case-study settings, suggesting that agent skill evolution is best viewed as posterior-guided harness optimization rather than uncalibrated prompt accumulation. The source code is available at https://github.com/DataArcTech/Bayesian-Agent.

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Following the success of Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) for Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), new techniques such as Sequence Likelihood Calibration (SLiC) and Direct Policy Optimization (DPO) have been proposed that are offline in nature and use rewards in an indirect manner. These techniques, in particular DPO, have recently become the tools of choice for LLM alignment due to their scalability and performance. However, they leave behind important features of the PPO approach. Methods such as SLiC or RRHF make use of the Reward Model (RM) only for ranking/preference, losing fine-grained information and ignoring the parametric form of the RM (eg., Bradley-Terry, Plackett-Luce), while methods such as DPO do not use even a separate reward model. In this work, we propose a novel approach, named BRAIn, that re-introduces the RM as part of a distribution matching approach.BRAIn considers the LLM distribution conditioned on the assumption of output goodness and applies Bayes theorem to derive an intractable posterior distribution where the RM is explicitly represented. BRAIn then distills this posterior into an amortized inference network through self-normalized importance sampling, leading to a scalable offline algorithm that significantly outperforms prior art in summarization and AntropicHH tasks. BRAIn also has interesting connections to PPO and DPO for specific RM choices.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve remarkable reasoning in domains like mathematics and coding, where verifiable rewards provide clear signals. However, extending this paradigm to financial decision is challenged by the market's stochastic nature: rewards are verifiable but inherently noisy, causing standard RL to degenerate into reward hacking. To address this, we propose Trade-R1, a model training framework that bridges verifiable rewards to stochastic environments via process-level reasoning verification. Our key innovation is a verification method that transforms the problem of evaluating reasoning over lengthy financial documents into a structured Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) task. We construct a triangular consistency metric, assessing pairwise alignment between retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and decisions to serve as a validity filter for noisy market returns. We explore two reward integration strategies: Fixed-effect Semantic Reward (FSR) for stable alignment signals, and Dynamic-effect Semantic Reward (DSR) for coupled magnitude optimization. Experiments on different country asset selection demonstrate that our paradigm reduces reward hacking, with DSR achieving superior cross-market generalization while maintaining the highest reasoning consistency.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Reward models are critical for aligning models to follow instructions, and are typically trained following one of two popular paradigms: Bradley-Terry style or Regression style. However, there is a lack of evidence that either approach is better than the other, when adequately matched for data. This is primarily because these approaches require data collected in different (but incompatible) formats, meaning that adequately matched data is not available in existing public datasets. To tackle this problem, we release preference annotations (designed for Bradley-Terry training) to complement existing ratings (designed for Regression style training) in the HelpSteer2 dataset. To improve data interpretability, preference annotations are accompanied with human-written justifications. Using this data, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of Bradley-Terry and Regression models when adequately matched for data. Based on insights derived from such a comparison, we propose a novel approach to combine Bradley-Terry and Regression reward modeling. A Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct model tuned with this approach scores 94.1 on RewardBench, emerging top of more than 140 reward models as of 1 Oct 2024. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this reward model at aligning models to follow instructions in RLHF. We open-source this dataset (CC-BY-4.0 license) at https://huggingface.co/datasets/nvidia/HelpSteer2 and openly release the trained Reward Model at https://huggingface.co/nvidia/Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Reward

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Knowledge benchmarks for LLMs face three issues: scaling-driven designs that do not operationalize disciplinary representativeness; flat-payment annotation that permits lazy consensus; and unaudited ranking instability under bounded test budgets. We introduce KINA, an 899-item benchmark across 261 fine-grained disciplines, with two formal results. First, we cast representativeness as a coverage-style objective over expert-elicited anchors and operationalize disciplinary representativeness through a proxy, yielding a (1-1/e) greedy approximation (Proposition 1); the guarantee applies to the proxy, not to population representativeness. Second, we prove a bonus-on-bar tournament weakly FOSD-dominates flat payment in released-review quality, with incentive-compatibility threshold B > Delta C / Delta p_min (Theorem 1). Evaluating 42 models from 13 labs, the top model, Gemini-3.1-Pro-Preview, reaches 53.17%, followed by Claude-Opus-4.6 at 49.92% and GPT-5.4 at 48.55%, leaving substantial headroom below saturation. The full leaderboard shows a tiered structure rather than a smooth total order: a small frontier tier lies above 48%, a dense strong-model tier spans roughly 38-45%, and low-performing models remain only modestly above the 10% chance baseline. Tool augmentation adds up to 5.17 points across the five tool-use evaluations, with gains varying substantially across models. We report bootstrap ranking-stability statistics to make bounded-budget variance explicit and to discourage over-interpretation of adjacent ranks.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

Reward models learned from human preferences are central to aligning large language models (LLMs) via reinforcement learning from human feedback, yet they are often vulnerable to reward hacking due to noisy annotations and systematic biases such as response length or style. We propose Bayesian Non-Negative Reward Model (BNRM), a principled reward modeling framework that integrates non-negative factor analysis into Bradley-Terry (BT) preference model. BNRM represents rewards through a sparse, non-negative latent factor generative process that operates at two complementary levels: instance-specific latent variables induce disentangled reward representations, while sparsity over global latent factors acts as an implicit debiasing mechanism that suppresses spurious correlations. Together, this disentanglement-then-debiasing structure enables robust uncertainty-aware reward learning. To scale BNRM to modern LLMs, we develop an amortized variational inference network conditioned on deep model representations, allowing efficient end-to-end training. Extensive empirical results demonstrate that BNRM substantially mitigates reward over-optimization, improves robustness under distribution shifts, and yields more interpretable reward decompositions than strong baselines.

Reward models (RMs) provide critical feedback signals for LLM post-training, notably in reinforced fine-tuning (RFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) pipelines. However, current reward evaluation relies on heterogeneous criteria such as rule-based verifiers, ground-truth references, procedural checklists, and complex rubrics, where a unified mechanism to integrate all types of evidence remains unexplored. To this end, we propose Skill Reward Model (Skill-RM), a unified framework that reformulates reward modeling as the execution of a reusable Reward-Evaluation Skill. By treating reward computation as a structured agentic task, Skill-RM provides a consistent interface to orchestrate heterogeneous resources, dynamically selecting and aggregating evidence tailored to the specific requirements of each input. This approach enables the reward model to move beyond static evaluation, ensuring consistency and transparency across diverse tasks. Extensive experiments on reward benchmarks and downstream applications, including best-of-N selection and reinforcement learning, demonstrate that Skill-RM consistently outperforms traditional judge baselines. Our findings suggest that Skill-RM not only provides a unified solution for reward modeling but also achieves superior performance through the strategic and dynamic orchestration of evidence. The code is at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/Skill-RM.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to progress toward more advanced forms of intelligence, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is increasingly seen as a key pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). However, the reliance on reward-model-based (RM-based) alignment methods introduces significant challenges due to the inherent instability and imperfections of Reward Models (RMs), which can lead to critical issues such as reward hacking and misalignment with human intentions. In this paper, we introduce a reward-robust RLHF framework aimed at addressing these fundamental challenges, paving the way for more reliable and resilient learning in LLMs. Our approach introduces a novel optimization objective that carefully balances performance and robustness by incorporating Bayesian Reward Model Ensembles (BRME) to model the uncertainty set of reward functions. This allows the framework to integrate both nominal performance and minimum reward signals, ensuring more stable learning even with imperfect reward models. Empirical results demonstrate that our framework consistently outperforms traditional RLHF across diverse benchmarks, showing improved accuracy and long-term stability. We also provide a theoretical analysis, demonstrating that reward-robust RLHF approaches the stability of constant reward settings, which proves to be effective in a stochastic-case analysis. Together, these contributions highlight the framework potential to enhance both the performance and stability of LLM alignment with RLHF.

Extending Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) to real-world tasks often requires balancing objective and subjective evaluation criteria. However, many such tasks lack a single, unambiguous ground truth-making it difficult to define reliable reward signals for post-training language models. While traditional preference-based methods offer a workaround, they rely on opaque reward functions that are difficult to interpret and prone to spurious correlations. We introduce Rubrics as Rewards (RaR), a framework that uses structured, checklist-style rubrics as interpretable reward signals for on-policy training with GRPO. Our best RaR method yields up to a 28% relative improvement on HealthBench-1k compared to simple Likert-based approaches, while matching or surpassing the performance of reward signals derived from expert-written references. By treating rubrics as structured reward signals, we show that RaR enables smaller-scale judge models to better align with human preferences and sustain robust performance across model scales.

The optimization of expensive-to-evaluate black-box functions is prevalent in various scientific disciplines. Bayesian optimization is an automatic, general and sample-efficient method to solve these problems with minimal knowledge of the underlying function dynamics. However, the ability of Bayesian optimization to incorporate prior knowledge or beliefs about the function at hand in order to accelerate the optimization is limited, which reduces its appeal for knowledgeable practitioners with tight budgets. To allow domain experts to customize the optimization routine, we propose ColaBO, the first Bayesian-principled framework for incorporating prior beliefs beyond the typical kernel structure, such as the likely location of the optimizer or the optimal value. The generality of ColaBO makes it applicable across different Monte Carlo acquisition functions and types of user beliefs. We empirically demonstrate ColaBO's ability to substantially accelerate optimization when the prior information is accurate, and to retain approximately default performance when it is misleading.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is bottlenecked by reward hacking, where the policy exploits errors in a proxy reward model (RM) and produces high RM scores without genuine quality gains. A natural mitigation is pessimism: lowering rewards in regions where the RM is uncertain. However, standard scalar RMs provide no principled notion of uncertainty. We argue that the right object is a distributional reward model p(rmid x,y). Under either a Bayesian inference or a KL-distributionally robust optimization (KL-DRO) lens, the KL-regularized RLHF objective admits a closed-form effective reward tilde r(x,y) = pmβlogE_p[e^{pm r/β}]. The pessimistic branch unifies the prior heuristics for RM ensemble aggregation: mean aggregation, worst-case optimization (WCO), and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO) all emerge as limits or truncations of this single expression. This also clarifies the implicit assumptions of each existing rule.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

In Causal Bayesian Optimization (CBO), an agent intervenes on an unknown structural causal model to maximize a downstream reward variable. In this paper, we consider the generalization where other agents or external events also intervene on the system, which is key for enabling adaptiveness to non-stationarities such as weather changes, market forces, or adversaries. We formalize this generalization of CBO as Adversarial Causal Bayesian Optimization (ACBO) and introduce the first algorithm for ACBO with bounded regret: Causal Bayesian Optimization with Multiplicative Weights (CBO-MW). Our approach combines a classical online learning strategy with causal modeling of the rewards. To achieve this, it computes optimistic counterfactual reward estimates by propagating uncertainty through the causal graph. We derive regret bounds for CBO-MW that naturally depend on graph-related quantities. We further propose a scalable implementation for the case of combinatorial interventions and submodular rewards. Empirically, CBO-MW outperforms non-causal and non-adversarial Bayesian optimization methods on synthetic environments and environments based on real-word data. Our experiments include a realistic demonstration of how CBO-MW can be used to learn users' demand patterns in a shared mobility system and reposition vehicles in strategic areas.

In natural human-to-human conversations, participants often receive feedback signals from one another based on their follow-up reactions. These reactions can include verbal responses, facial expressions, changes in emotional state, and other non-verbal cues. Similarly, in human-machine interactions, the machine can leverage the user's follow-up utterances as feedback signals to assess whether it has appropriately addressed the user's request. Therefore, we propose using the likelihood of follow-up utterances as rewards to differentiate preferred responses from less favored ones, without relying on human or commercial LLM-based preference annotations. Our proposed reward mechanism, ``Follow-up Likelihood as Reward" (FLR), matches the performance of strong reward models trained on large-scale human or GPT-4 annotated data on 8 pairwise-preference and 4 rating-based benchmarks. Building upon the FLR mechanism, we propose to automatically mine preference data from the online generations of a base policy model. The preference data are subsequently used to boost the helpfulness of the base model through direct alignment from preference (DAP) methods, such as direct preference optimization (DPO). Lastly, we demonstrate that fine-tuning the language model that provides follow-up likelihood with natural language feedback significantly enhances FLR's performance on reward modeling benchmarks and effectiveness in aligning the base policy model's helpfulness.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

This paper proposes an online, provably robust, and scalable Bayesian approach for changepoint detection. The resulting algorithm has key advantages over previous work: it provides provable robustness by leveraging the generalised Bayesian perspective, and also addresses the scalability issues of previous attempts. Specifically, the proposed generalised Bayesian formalism leads to conjugate posteriors whose parameters are available in closed form by leveraging diffusion score matching. The resulting algorithm is exact, can be updated through simple algebra, and is more than 10 times faster than its closest competitor.

Aligning large language models to human preferences is inherently multidimensional, yet most pipelines collapse heterogeneous signals into a single optimizeable objective. We seek to answer what it would take to simultaneously align a model across various domains spanning those with: verifiable rewards (mathematical accuracy), non-verifiable subjective preferences (human values), and complex interactive scenarios (multi-turn AI tutoring dialogues). Such multi-objective reinforcement learning setups are often plagued by the individual objectives being at odds with each other, resulting in inefficient training and little user control during inference. We propose a unified framework that: (i) standardizes {process reward model} (PRM) training across both verifiable and non-verifiable settings to better supervise models' chain-of-thought reasoning; (ii) performs {multi-objective alignment} by training the LLM with our Multi-Action-Head DPO (MAH-DPO) and a vectorized reward where the dimensions of the vector correspond to the various objectives instead of a single scalar; and (iii) demonstrates how such a system provides fine-grained inference-time user control. Experiments across math reasoning, value alignment, and multi-turn dialogue show that our framework improves performance across multiple objectives simultaneously, while minimizing cross-objective trade-offs and enabling flexible inference time user control. The code can be found at https://github.com/pearls-lab/multiobj-align.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

Most bandit algorithms assume that the reward variances or their upper bounds are known, and that they are the same for all arms. This naturally leads to suboptimal performance and higher regret due to variance overestimation. On the other hand, underestimated reward variances may lead to linear regret due to committing early to a suboptimal arm. This motivated prior works on variance-adaptive frequentist algorithms, which have strong instance-dependent regret bounds but cannot incorporate prior knowledge on reward variances. We lay foundations for the Bayesian setting, which incorporates prior knowledge. This results in lower regret in practice, due to using the prior in the algorithm design, and also improved regret guarantees. Specifically, we study Gaussian bandits with {unknown heterogeneous reward variances}, and develop a Thompson sampling algorithm with prior-dependent Bayes regret bounds. We achieve lower regret with lower reward variances and more informative priors on them, which is precisely why we pay only for what is uncertain. This is the first result of its kind. Finally, we corroborate our theory with extensive experiments, which show the superiority of our variance-adaptive Bayesian algorithm over prior frequentist approaches. We also show that our approach is robust to model misspecification and can be applied with estimated priors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-agent systems (MAS) have shown promise for complex tasks, yet current training methods lack principled ways to connect system-level evaluation with agent- and message-level learning. We propose a theoretical framework that unifies cooperative game-theoretic attribution with process reward modeling to transform system evaluation to agent credit to response-level signals. Unlike prior approaches that rely only on attribution (Shapley) or step-level labels (PRM), our method produces local, signed, and credit-conserving signals. In success cases, Shapley-based credit assignment fairly allocates outcomes across agents and is refined into per-message rewards that promote cooperation while discouraging redundancy or sabotage; in failure cases, first-error localization yields repair-aware preferences that penalize harmful steps while rewarding corrective attempts. The resulting signals are bounded, cooperative, and directly compatible with reinforcement- or preference-based post-training, providing a unified and auditable pathway from global evaluation to local supervision in LLM multi-agent training. Our contribution is conceptual: we present a theoretical foundation and training signals, leaving empirical validation for future work.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Reward models (RMs) are crucial for the training and inference-time scaling up of large language models (LLMs). However, existing reward models primarily focus on human preferences, neglecting verifiable correctness signals which have shown strong potential in training LLMs. In this paper, we propose agentic reward modeling, a reward system that combines reward models with verifiable correctness signals from different aspects to provide reliable rewards. We empirically implement a reward agent, named RewardAgent, that combines human preference rewards with two verifiable signals: factuality and instruction following, to provide more reliable rewards. We conduct comprehensive experiments on existing reward model benchmarks and inference time best-of-n searches on real-world downstream tasks. RewardAgent significantly outperforms vanilla reward models, demonstrating its effectiveness. We further construct training preference pairs using RewardAgent and train an LLM with the DPO objective, achieving superior performance on various NLP benchmarks compared to conventional reward models. Our codes are publicly released to facilitate further research (https://github.com/THU-KEG/Agentic-Reward-Modeling).

Recent advances in aligning Large Language Models with human preferences have benefited from larger reward models and better preference data. However, most of these methodologies rely on the accuracy of the reward model. The reward models used in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) are typically learned from small datasets using stochastic optimization algorithms, making them prone to high variability. We illustrate the inconsistencies between reward models empirically on numerous open-source datasets. We theoretically show that the fluctuation of the reward models can be detrimental to the alignment problem because the derived policies are more overfitted to the reward model and, hence, are riskier if the reward model itself is uncertain. We use concentration of measure to motivate an uncertainty-aware, conservative algorithm for policy optimization. We show that such policies are more risk-averse in the sense that they are more cautious of uncertain rewards. We theoretically prove that our proposed methodology has less risk than the vanilla method. We corroborate our theoretical results with experiments based on designing an ensemble of reward models. We use this ensemble of reward models to align a language model using our methodology and observe that our empirical findings match our theoretical predictions.

Reward modeling (RM), which captures human preferences to align large language models (LLMs), is increasingly employed in tasks such as model finetuning, response filtering, and ranking. However, due to the inherent complexity of human preferences and the limited coverage of available datasets, reward models often fail under distributional shifts or adversarial perturbations. Existing approaches for identifying such failure modes typically rely on prior knowledge about preference distributions or failure attributes, limiting their practicality in real-world settings where such information is unavailable. In this work, we propose a tractable, preference-distribution agnostic method for discovering reward model failure modes via reward guided controlled decoding. Building on this, we introduce REFORM, a self-improving reward modeling framework that enhances robustness by using the reward model itself to guide the generation of falsely scored responses. These adversarial examples are then used to augment the training data and patch the reward model's misaligned behavior. We evaluate REFORM on two widely used preference datasets Anthropic Helpful Harmless (HH) and PKU Beavertails and demonstrate that it significantly improves robustness without sacrificing reward quality. Notably, REFORM preserves performance both in direct evaluation and in downstream policy training, and further improves alignment quality by removing spurious correlations.

Reinforcement fine-tuning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for equipping large vision-language models (LVLMs) with agentic capabilities such as tool use and multi-step reasoning. Despite striking empirical successes, most notably Visual Agentic Reinforcement Fine-Tuning (Visual-ARFT), the theoretical underpinnings of this paradigm remain poorly understood. In particular, two critical questions lack rigorous answers: (i)~how does the composite structure of verifiable rewards (format compliance, answer accuracy, tool executability) affect the convergence of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), and (ii)~why does training on a small set of tool-augmented tasks transfer to out-of-distribution domains? We address these gaps by introducing the Tool-Augmented Markov Decision Process (TA-MDP), a formal framework that models multimodal agentic decision-making with bounded-depth tool calls. Within this framework, we establish three main results. First, we prove that GRPO under composite verifiable rewards converges to a first-order stationary point at rate O(1/T) with explicit dependence on the number of reward components and group size (Theorem~1). Second, we derive a Reward Decomposition Theorem that bounds the sub-optimality gap between decomposed per-component optimization and joint optimization, providing a precise characterization of when reward decomposition is beneficial (Theorem~2). Third, we establish a PAC-Bayes generalization bound for tool-augmented policies that explains the strong out-of-distribution transfer observed in Visual-ARFT (Theorem~3).

Aligning multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with human preferences often relies on single-signal, model-based reward methods. Such monolithic rewards often lack confidence calibration across domain-specific tasks, fail to capture diverse aspects of human preferences, and require extensive data annotation and reward model training. In this work, we propose a hybrid reward modeling framework that integrates complementary reward paradigms: (i) model-based rewards, where a learned reward model predicts scalar or vector scores from synthetic and human feedback, and (ii) rule-based rewards, where domain-specific heuristics provide explicit correctness signals with confidence. Beyond accuracy, we further incorporate multi-aspect rewards to enforce instruction adherence and introduce a generalized length-penalty reward to stabilize training and improve performance. The proposed framework provides a flexible and effective approach to aligning MLLMs through reinforcement learning policy optimization. Our experiments show consistent improvements across different multimodal benchmarks when applying hybrid and multi-aspect reward modeling. Our best performing model in the 3B family achieves an overall average improvement of ~9.5% across general and math reasoning tasks. Focusing specifically on mathematical benchmarks, the model achieves a significant average improvement of ~16%, highlighting its effectiveness in mathematical reasoning and problem solving.

Large foundation models pretrained on raw web-scale data are not readily deployable without additional step of extensive alignment to human preferences. Such alignment is typically done by collecting large amounts of pairwise comparisons from humans ("Do you prefer output A or B?") and learning a reward model or a policy with the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model as a proxy for a human's underlying implicit preferences. These methods generally suffer from assuming a universal preference shared by all humans, which lacks the flexibility of adapting to plurality of opinions and preferences. In this work, we propose PAL, a framework to model human preference complementary to existing pretraining strategies, which incorporates plurality from the ground up. We propose using the ideal point model as a lens to view alignment using preference comparisons. Together with our novel reformulation and using mixture modeling, our framework captures the plurality of population preferences while simultaneously learning a common preference latent space across different preferences, which can few-shot generalize to new, unseen users. Our approach enables us to use the penultimate-layer representation of large foundation models and simple MLP layers to learn reward functions that are on-par with the existing large state-of-the-art reward models, thereby enhancing efficiency of reward modeling significantly. We show that PAL achieves competitive reward model accuracy compared to strong baselines on 1) Language models with Summary dataset ; 2) Image Generative models with Pick-a-Pic dataset ; 3) A new semisynthetic heterogeneous dataset generated using Anthropic Personas. Finally, our experiments also highlight the shortcoming of current preference datasets that are created using rigid rubrics which wash away heterogeneity, and call for more nuanced data collection approaches.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

In many multi-agent systems, agents interact repeatedly and are expected to settle into stable, rational behavior over time. Yet in practice, behavior often drifts, and detecting such deviations in real time remains an open challenge. We introduce a sequential testing framework that monitors whether observed play is consistent with a benchmark of strategic behavior, without assuming a fixed sample size. Our approach builds on the e-value framework for safe anytime-valid inference: by "betting" against the benchmark, we construct a test supermartingale that accumulates evidence whenever observed payoffs systematically violate the expected conditions. For repeated normal-form games, we take equilibrium as the benchmark, yielding a statistically sound, interpretable measure of departure from equilibrium that can be monitored online; our framework unifies the treatment of Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria, offering finite-time guarantees and a detailed analysis of detection times. We also leverage Benjamini-Hochberg-type procedures to increase detection power in large games while rigorously controlling the false discovery rate. Finally, we extend our method to stochastic games, verifying online whether observed trajectories adhere to a specified target policy, such as a computed equilibrium, broadening the framework's applicability to dynamic, state-dependent settings.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards can in principle train calibrated probabilistic forecasters, since a proper scoring rule such as the Brier score is computed from outcomes alone and is minimized in expectation by the true probability. In practice it degrades calibration, and existing remedies address epistemic uncertainty, where a model's confidence accompanies a verifiably correct or incorrect answer. We study aleatoric forecasting, where the forecast itself is the output and the label is one stochastic outcome, taking NFL in-game win probability as a testbed with the betting market as a reference. Rewarding the realized per-play outcome fails, because the single outcome is a noisy target and the policy gradient corrupts the chain of thought. We introduce a verifiable, label-free reward, a state-conditioned empirical win rate estimated from past outcomes, that removes the label noise, and we keep the gradient off the reasoning, by direct prediction or a gradient mask, so it cannot be corrupted. Trained with this reward alone, without human labels or supervised fine-tuning, a 7B model reaches the calibration of the betting market by direct prediction and is better calibrated than a zero-shot frontier model. That frontier model and a tabular estimator reach the same Brier score as this model, identifying the market's small remaining edge as live in-game information beyond their shared inputs. Masking the gradient, rather than dropping the chain of thought, preserves reasoning from which the forecast follows, which ordinary chain-of-thought training corrupts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

It is often very challenging to manually design reward functions for complex, real-world tasks. To solve this, one can instead use reward learning to infer a reward function from data. However, there are often multiple reward functions that fit the data equally well, even in the infinite-data limit. This means that the reward function is only partially identifiable. In this work, we formally characterise the partial identifiability of the reward function given several popular reward learning data sources, including expert demonstrations and trajectory comparisons. We also analyse the impact of this partial identifiability for several downstream tasks, such as policy optimisation. We unify our results in a framework for comparing data sources and downstream tasks by their invariances, with implications for the design and selection of data sources for reward learning.

Dynamical generative models that produce samples through an iterative process, such as Flow Matching and denoising diffusion models, have seen widespread use, but there have not been many theoretically-sound methods for improving these models with reward fine-tuning. In this work, we cast reward fine-tuning as stochastic optimal control (SOC). Critically, we prove that a very specific memoryless noise schedule must be enforced during fine-tuning, in order to account for the dependency between the noise variable and the generated samples. We also propose a new algorithm named Adjoint Matching which outperforms existing SOC algorithms, by casting SOC problems as a regression problem. We find that our approach significantly improves over existing methods for reward fine-tuning, achieving better consistency, realism, and generalization to unseen human preference reward models, while retaining sample diversity.

In the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, a randomized probability matching policy called Thompson sampling (TS) has shown excellent performance in various reward models. In addition to the empirical performance, TS has been shown to achieve asymptotic problem-dependent lower bounds in several models. However, its optimality has been mainly addressed under light-tailed or one-parameter models that belong to exponential families. In this paper, we consider the optimality of TS for the Pareto model that has a heavy tail and is parameterized by two unknown parameters. Specifically, we discuss the optimality of TS with probability matching priors that include the Jeffreys prior and the reference priors. We first prove that TS with certain probability matching priors can achieve the optimal regret bound. Then, we show the suboptimality of TS with other priors, including the Jeffreys and the reference priors. Nevertheless, we find that TS with the Jeffreys and reference priors can achieve the asymptotic lower bound if one uses a truncation procedure. These results suggest carefully choosing noninformative priors to avoid suboptimality and show the effectiveness of truncation procedures in TS-based policies.

Specifying rewards for reinforcement learned (RL) agents is challenging. Preference-based RL (PbRL) mitigates these challenges by inferring a reward from feedback over sets of trajectories. However, the effectiveness of PbRL is limited by the amount of feedback needed to reliably recover the structure of the target reward. We present the PRIor Over Rewards (PRIOR) framework, which incorporates priors about the structure of the reward function and the preference feedback into the reward learning process. Imposing these priors as soft constraints on the reward learning objective reduces the amount of feedback required by half and improves overall reward recovery. Additionally, we demonstrate that using an abstract state space for the computation of the priors further improves the reward learning and the agent's performance.

We introduce Psi-Sampler, an SMC-based framework incorporating pCNL-based initial particle sampling for effective inference-time reward alignment with a score-based generative model. Inference-time reward alignment with score-based generative models has recently gained significant traction, following a broader paradigm shift from pre-training to post-training optimization. At the core of this trend is the application of Sequential Monte Carlo (SMC) to the denoising process. However, existing methods typically initialize particles from the Gaussian prior, which inadequately captures reward-relevant regions and results in reduced sampling efficiency. We demonstrate that initializing from the reward-aware posterior significantly improves alignment performance. To enable posterior sampling in high-dimensional latent spaces, we introduce the preconditioned Crank-Nicolson Langevin (pCNL) algorithm, which combines dimension-robust proposals with gradient-informed dynamics. This approach enables efficient and scalable posterior sampling and consistently improves performance across various reward alignment tasks, including layout-to-image generation, quantity-aware generation, and aesthetic-preference generation, as demonstrated in our experiments.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

Rubric-augmented verification guides reward models with explicit evaluation criteria, yielding more reliable judgments than single-model verification. However, most existing methods require costly rubric annotations, limiting scalability. Moreover, we find that rubric generation is vulnerable to a failure of cooperation; low-quality rubrics actively mislead reward models rather than help. Inspired by the principle of cooperative communication, we propose Cooperative yet Critical reward modeling (C2), a framework that significantly improves reward model judgments by having the reward model critically collaborate with a rubric generator trained solely from binary preferences. In C2, we synthesize helpful and misleading rubric pairs by measuring how each rubric shifts the reward model toward or away from the correct preference. Using these contrastive pairs, we train a cooperative rubric generator to propose helpful rubrics, and a critical verifier to assess rubric validity before making its judgment, following only rubrics it deems helpful at inference time. C2 outperforms reasoning reward models trained on the same binary preferences, with gains of up to 6.5 points on RM-Bench and 6.0 points length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0. Without external rubric annotations, C2 enables an 8B reward model to match performance achieved with rubrics from a 4times larger model. Overall, our work demonstrates that eliciting deliberate cooperation in rubric-augmented verification makes reward models more trustworthy in a scalable way.

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

Large language models~(LLMs) are expected to be helpful, harmless, and honest. In alignment scenarios such as safety, confidence, and general preference alignment, binary preference data collection and reward modeling are resource-intensive but essential for transferring human preference. In this work, we explore using the similarity between sampled generations and high-quality reference answers as an alternative reward function choice for LLM alignment. Similarity reward circumvents binary preference data collection and reward modeling when unary high-quality reference answers are available. We introduce RefAlign, a versatile REINFORCE-style alignment algorithm that does not rely on reference or reward models. RefAlign utilizes similarity metrics, such as BERTScore between sampled generations and reference answers as surrogate rewards. Beyond general human preference optimization, RefAlign can be readily extended to diverse scenarios, such as safety and confidence alignment, by incorporating the similarity reward with task-related objectives. In various scenarios, RefAlign demonstrates comparable performance to previous alignment methods without binary preference data and reward models.

While reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has advanced LLM reasoning in structured domains like mathematics and programming, its application to general-domain reasoning tasks remains challenging due to the absence of verifiable reward signals. To this end, methods like Reinforcement Learning with Reference Probability Reward (RLPR) have emerged, leveraging the probability of generating the final answer as a reward signal. However, these outcome-focused approaches neglect crucial step-by-step supervision of the reasoning process itself. To address this gap, we introduce Probabilistic Process Supervision (P2S), a novel self-supervision framework that provides fine-grained process rewards without requiring a separate reward model or human-annotated reasoning steps. During reinforcement learning, P2S synthesizes and filters a high-quality reference reasoning chain (gold-CoT). The core of our method is to calculate a Path Faithfulness Reward (PFR) for each reasoning step, which is derived from the conditional probability of generating the gold-CoT's suffix, given the model's current reasoning prefix. Crucially, this PFR can be flexibly integrated with any outcome-based reward, directly tackling the reward sparsity problem by providing dense guidance. Extensive experiments on reading comprehension and medical Question Answering benchmarks show that P2S significantly outperforms strong baselines.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Diffusion models achieve state-of-the-art generative performance but are fundamentally bottlenecked by their slow, iterative sampling process. While diffusion distillation techniques enable high-fidelity, few-step generation, traditional objectives often restrict the student's performance by anchoring it solely to the teacher. Recent approaches have attempted to break this ceiling by integrating Reinforcement Learning (RL), typically through a simple summation of distillation and RL objectives. In this work, we propose a novel paradigm by re-conceptualizing distribution matching as a reward, denoted as R_dm. This unified perspective bridges the algorithmic gap between Diffusion Matching Distillation (DMD) and RL, providing several primary benefits. (1) Enhanced Optimization Stability: We introduce Group Normalized Distribution Matching (GNDM), which adapts standard RL group normalization to stabilize R_dm estimation. By leveraging group-mean statistics, GNDM establishes a more robust and effective optimization direction. (2) Seamless Reward Integration: Our reward-centric formulation inherently supports adaptive weighting mechanisms, allowing for the fluid combination of DMD with external reward models. (3) Improved Sampling Efficiency: By aligning with RL principles, the framework readily incorporates Importance Sampling (IS), leading to a significant boost in sampling efficiency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GNDM outperforms vanilla DMD, reducing the FID by 1.87. Furthermore, our multi-reward variant, GNDMR, surpasses existing baselines by striking an optimal balance between aesthetic quality and fidelity, achieving a peak HPS of 30.37 and a low FID-SD of 12.21. Ultimately, R_dm provides a flexible, stable, and efficient framework for real-time, high-fidelity synthesis. Codes are coming soon.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Existing alignment methods share a common topology of information flow, where reward information is collected from humans, modeled with preference learning, and used to tune language models. However, this shared topology has not been systematically characterized, nor have its alternatives been thoroughly explored, leaving the problems of low data efficiency and unreliable generalization unaddressed. As a solution, we introduce a theoretical framework for investigating reward generalization in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), focusing on the topology of information flow at both macro and micro levels. At the macro level, we portray the RLHF information flow as an autoencoding process over behavior distributions, formalizing the RLHF objective of distributional consistency between human preference and model behavior. At the micro level, we present induced Bayesian networks as a theory of reward generalization in RLHF, introducing fine-grained dataset topologies into generalization bounds. Combining analysis on both levels, we propose reward modeling from tree-structured preference information. It is shown to reduce reward uncertainty by up to Theta(log n/loglog n) times compared to baselines, where n is the dataset size. Validation on three NLP tasks shows that our tree-based reward model achieves an average win rate of 65% against baseline methods, thus improving reward generalization for free via topology design.

Score- and flow-matching models often rely on preference-based reinforcement learning for two purposes: aligning with subjective preferences and, surprisingly, recovering properties such as visual realism and coherent object structure that matching-based training is intended to learn from the data itself. We argue that this reflects a structural mismatch. Matching losses measure ell_2 regression error on the velocity or score field under training-time marginals, a proxy poorly aligned with the visual and semantic properties that determine sample quality at inference. Given a reward aligned with these properties, RL sidesteps the mismatch by evaluating the model on its own samples and following the reward landscape directly. The challenge is to obtain such a reward without relying on human preferences, which are expensive and conflate data realism with annotator inclinations. We propose Discriminator-Guided RL (DRL). DRL trains a discriminator to separate data from base-model samples in a pretrained representation space and uses its logit as the reward in KL-regularized RL. The pretrained space restricts the discriminator to perceptually meaningful directions, and the logit estimates the log-likelihood ratio between data and model, which is the optimal reward for targeting the data distribution. Across SiT, JiT, REPA, and RAE, DRL reduces guidance-free FID (e.g., 9.38 to 2.62 on SiT) and semantic-space FD (e.g., 88.2 to 19.3 on DINOv3 for SiT), with consistent gains across all backbones, and improves human-preference rewards without training on them. It also yields a better Pareto frontier between preference reward and image fidelity under subsequent preference-based post-training, increasing alignment while reducing low-level artifacts such as oversaturation and excessive brightness.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) demonstrates promising potential in advancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. However, its success remains largely confined to mathematical and code domains. This primary limitation stems from the heavy reliance on domain-specific verifiers, which results in prohibitive complexity and limited scalability. To address the challenge, our key observation is that LLM's intrinsic probability of generating a correct free-form answer directly indicates its own evaluation of the reasoning reward (i.e., how well the reasoning process leads to the correct answer). Building on this insight, we propose RLPR, a simple verifier-free framework that extrapolates RLVR to broader general domains. RLPR uses the LLM's own token probability scores for reference answers as the reward signal and maximizes the expected reward during training. We find that addressing the high variance of this noisy probability reward is crucial to make it work, and propose prob-to-reward and stabilizing methods to ensure a precise and stable reward from LLM intrinsic probabilities. Comprehensive experiments in four general-domain benchmarks and three mathematical benchmarks show that RLPR consistently improves reasoning capabilities in both areas for Gemma, Llama, and Qwen based models. Notably, RLPR outperforms concurrent VeriFree by 7.6 points on TheoremQA and 7.5 points on Minerva, and even surpasses strong verifier-model-dependent approaches General-Reasoner by 1.6 average points across seven benchmarks.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Reward modelling from preference data is a crucial step in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values, requiring robust generalisation to novel prompt-response pairs. In this work, we propose to frame this problem in a causal paradigm, providing the rich toolbox of causality to identify the persistent challenges, such as causal misidentification, preference heterogeneity, and confounding due to user-specific factors. Inheriting from the literature of causal inference, we identify key assumptions necessary for reliable generalisation and contrast them with common data collection practices. We illustrate failure modes of naive reward models and demonstrate how causally-inspired approaches can improve model robustness. Finally, we outline desiderata for future research and practices, advocating targeted interventions to address inherent limitations of observational data.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has demonstrated promising gains in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, its dependence on domain-specific verifiers significantly restricts its applicability to open and general domains. Recent efforts such as RLPR have extended RLVR to general domains, enabling training on broader datasets and achieving improvements over RLVR. However, a notable limitation of these methods is their tendency to overfit to reference answers, which constrains the model's ability to generate diverse outputs. This limitation is particularly pronounced in open-ended tasks such as writing, where multiple plausible answers exist. To address this, we propose DARL, a simple yet effective reinforcement learning framework that encourages the generation of diverse answers within a controlled deviation range from the reference while preserving alignment with it. Our framework is fully compatible with existing general reinforcement learning methods and can be seamlessly integrated without additional verifiers. Extensive experiments on thirteen benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements in reasoning performance. Notably, DARL surpasses RLPR, achieving average gains of 1.3 points on six reasoning benchmarks and 9.5 points on seven general benchmarks, highlighting its effectiveness in improving both reasoning accuracy and output diversity.

Existing studies on preference optimization (PO) have centered on constructing pairwise preference data following simple heuristics, such as maximizing the margin between preferred and dispreferred completions based on human (or AI) ranked scores. However, none of these heuristics has a full theoretical justification. In this work, we develop a novel PO framework that provides theoretical guidance to effectively sample dispreferred completions. To achieve this, we formulate PO as minimizing the negative log-likelihood (NLL) of a probability model and propose to estimate its normalization constant via a sampling strategy. As we will demonstrate, these estimative samples can act as dispreferred completions in PO. We then select contrastive divergence (CD) as the sampling strategy, and propose a novel MC-PO algorithm that applies the Monte Carlo (MC) kernel from CD to sample hard negatives w.r.t. the parameterized reward model. Finally, we propose the OnMC-PO algorithm, an extension of MC-PO to the online setting. On popular alignment benchmarks, MC-PO outperforms existing SOTA baselines, and OnMC-PO leads to further improvement.

Imitation learning from human-provided demonstrations is a strong approach for learning policies for robot manipulation. While the ideal dataset for imitation learning is homogenous and low-variance -- reflecting a single, optimal method for performing a task -- natural human behavior has a great deal of heterogeneity, with several optimal ways to demonstrate a task. This multimodality is inconsequential to human users, with task variations manifesting as subconscious choices; for example, reaching down, then across to grasp an object, versus reaching across, then down. Yet, this mismatch presents a problem for interactive imitation learning, where sequences of users improve on a policy by iteratively collecting new, possibly conflicting demonstrations. To combat this problem of demonstrator incompatibility, this work designs an approach for 1) measuring the compatibility of a new demonstration given a base policy, and 2) actively eliciting more compatible demonstrations from new users. Across two simulation tasks requiring long-horizon, dexterous manipulation and a real-world "food plating" task with a Franka Emika Panda arm, we show that we can both identify incompatible demonstrations via post-hoc filtering, and apply our compatibility measure to actively elicit compatible demonstrations from new users, leading to improved task success rates across simulated and real environments.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We introduce ALaRM, the first framework modeling hierarchical rewards in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), which is designed to enhance the alignment of large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. The framework addresses the limitations of current alignment approaches, which often struggle with the inconsistency and sparsity of human supervision signals, by integrating holistic rewards with aspect-specific rewards. This integration enables more precise and consistent guidance of language models towards desired outcomes, particularly in complex and open text generation tasks. By employing a methodology that filters and combines multiple rewards based on their consistency, the framework provides a reliable mechanism for improving model alignment. We validate our approach through applications in long-form question answering and machine translation tasks, employing gpt-3.5-turbo for pairwise comparisons, and demonstrate improvements over existing baselines. Our work underscores the effectiveness of hierarchical rewards modeling in refining LLM training processes for better human preference alignment. We release our code at https://ALaRM-fdu.github.io.

Persuasion, a fundamental social capability for humans, remains a challenge for AI systems such as large language models (LLMs). Current studies often overlook the strategic use of information asymmetry in message design or rely on strong assumptions regarding pre-commitment. In this work, we explore the application of Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language within single-turn dialogue settings, to enhance the strategic persuasion capabilities of LLMs. Our framework incorporates a commitment-communication mechanism, where the persuader explicitly outlines an information schema by narrating their potential types (e.g., honest or dishonest), thereby guiding the persuadee in performing the intended Bayesian belief update. We evaluate two variants of our approach: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) BP and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL) BP, benchmarking them against both naive and strong non-BP (NBP) baselines within a comprehensive evaluation framework. This framework covers a diverse set of persuadees -- including LLM instances with varying prompts and fine-tuning and human participants -- across tasks ranging from specially designed persuasion scenarios to general everyday situations. Experimental results on LLM-based agents reveal three main findings: (1) LLMs guided by BP strategies consistently achieve higher persuasion success rates than NBP baselines; (2) SFNL exhibits greater credibility and logical coherence, while FNL shows stronger emotional resonance and robustness in naturalistic conversations; (3) with supervised fine-tuning, smaller models can attain BP performance comparable to that of larger models.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

We show that reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) can elicit strong mathematical reasoning in certain models even with spurious rewards that have little, no, or even negative correlation with the correct answer. For example, RLVR improves MATH-500 performance for Qwen2.5-Math-7B in absolute points by 21.4% (random reward), 13.8% (format reward), 24.1% (incorrect label), 26.0% (1-shot RL), and 27.1% (majority voting) -- nearly matching the 29.1% gained with ground truth rewards. However, the spurious rewards that work for Qwen often fail to yield gains with other model families like Llama3 or OLMo2. In particular, we find code reasoning -- thinking in code without actual code execution -- to be a distinctive Qwen2.5-Math behavior that becomes significantly more frequent after RLVR, from 65% to over 90%, even with spurious rewards. Overall, we hypothesize that, given the lack of useful reward signal, RLVR must somehow be surfacing useful reasoning representations learned during pretraining, although the exact mechanism remains a topic for future work. We suggest that future RLVR research should possibly be validated on diverse models rather than a single de facto choice, as we show that it is easy to get significant performance gains on Qwen models even with completely spurious reward signals.

Extrinsic rewards can effectively guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents in specific tasks. However, extrinsic rewards frequently fall short in complex environments due to the significant human effort needed for their design and annotation. This limitation underscores the necessity for intrinsic rewards, which offer auxiliary and dense signals and can enable agents to learn in an unsupervised manner. Although various intrinsic reward formulations have been proposed, their implementation and optimization details are insufficiently explored and lack standardization, thereby hindering research progress. To address this gap, we introduce RLeXplore, a unified, highly modularized, and plug-and-play framework offering reliable implementations of eight state-of-the-art intrinsic reward methods. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth study that identifies critical implementation details and establishes well-justified standard practices in intrinsically-motivated RL. Our documentation, examples, and source code are available at https://github.com/RLE-Foundation/RLeXplore.

LLM agents operate in two distinct regimes: open-weight agents amenable to reinforcement learning (RL) and black-box agents whose behaviour must be controlled purely at test time. Although black-box agents are often backed by state-of-the-art proprietary LLMs, API-only access precludes parameter-level optimization, rendering most RL methods inapplicable. To address this limitation, we turn to a known equivalence between RL and Bayesian inference. We propose Agentic Monte Carlo (AMC) to directly sample from the optimal policy of a black-box agent rather than training it through RL. The optimal policy is a posterior over trajectories whose prior we define as the fixed black-box LLM agent. We employ Sequential Monte Carlo to sample from this posterior by learning a value function to steer the agent while leaving the underlying black-box model unchanged. We validate AMC on three diverse environments from the AgentGym benchmark, demonstrating significant improvements over prompting baselines and even outperforming Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) as we scale the test-time compute of our method. AMC demonstrates the feasibility of performing principled RL-style optimization of black-box LLM agents. Code is available at https://github.com/layer6ai-labs/Agentic-Monte-Carlo

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant progress in performing complex tasks. While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has been effective in aligning LLMs with human preferences, it is susceptible to spurious correlations in reward modeling. Consequently, it often introduces biases-such as length bias, sycophancy, conceptual bias, and discrimination that hinder the model's ability to capture true causal relationships. To address this, we propose a novel causal reward modeling approach that integrates causal inference to mitigate these spurious correlations. Our method enforces counterfactual invariance, ensuring reward predictions remain consistent when irrelevant variables are altered. Through experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, we show that our approach mitigates various types of spurious correlations effectively, resulting in more reliable and fair alignment of LLMs with human preferences. As a drop-in enhancement to the existing RLHF workflow, our causal reward modeling provides a practical way to improve the trustworthiness and fairness of LLM finetuning.

Popular offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods rely on conservatism, either by penalizing out-of-dataset actions or by restricting rollout horizons. In this work, we question the universality of this principle and instead revisit a complementary one: a Bayesian perspective. Rather than enforcing conservatism, the Bayesian approach tackles epistemic uncertainty in offline data by modeling a posterior distribution over plausible world models and training a history-dependent agent to maximize expected rewards, enabling test-time generalization. We first illustrate, in a bandit setting, that Bayesianism excels on low-quality datasets where conservatism fails. We then scale this principle to realistic tasks and show that long-horizon planning is critical for reducing value overestimation once conservatism is removed. To make this feasible, we introduce key design choices for performing and learning from long-horizon rollouts while controlling compounding errors. These yield our algorithm, NEUBAY, grounded in the neutral Bayesian principle. On D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, NEUBAY generally matches or surpasses leading conservative algorithms, achieving new state-of-the-art on 7 datasets. Notably, it succeeds with rollout horizons of several hundred steps, contrary to dominant practice. Finally, we characterize datasets by quality and coverage, showing when NEUBAY is preferable to conservative methods. Together, we argue NEUBAY lays the foundation for a new practical direction in offline and model-based RL.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

Aligning diffusion models with human preferences remains challenging, particularly when reward models are unavailable or impractical to obtain, and collecting large-scale preference datasets is prohibitively expensive. This raises a fundamental question: can we achieve effective alignment using only minimal human feedback, without auxiliary reward models, by unlocking the latent capabilities within diffusion models themselves? In this paper, we propose SAIL (Self-Amplified Iterative Learning), a novel framework that enables diffusion models to act as their own teachers through iterative self-improvement. Starting from a minimal seed set of human-annotated preference pairs, SAIL operates in a closed-loop manner where the model progressively generates diverse samples, self-annotates preferences based on its evolving understanding, and refines itself using this self-augmented dataset. To ensure robust learning and prevent catastrophic forgetting, we introduce a ranked preference mixup strategy that carefully balances exploration with adherence to initial human priors. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAIL consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods across multiple benchmarks while using merely 6\% of the preference data required by existing approaches, revealing that diffusion models possess remarkable self-improvement capabilities that, when properly harnessed, can effectively replace both large-scale human annotation and external reward models.

Long-tailed classification is challenging due to its heavy imbalance in class probabilities. While existing methods often focus on overall accuracy or accuracy for tail classes, they overlook a critical aspect: certain types of errors can carry greater risks than others in real-world long-tailed problems. For example, misclassifying patients (a tail class) as healthy individuals (a head class) entails far more serious consequences than the reverse scenario. To address this critical issue, we introduce Making Reliable and Flexible Decisions in Long-tailed Classification (RF-DLC), a novel framework aimed at reliable predictions in long-tailed problems. Leveraging Bayesian Decision Theory, we introduce an integrated gain to seamlessly combine long-tailed data distributions and the decision-making procedure. We further propose an efficient variational optimization strategy for the decision risk objective. Our method adapts readily to diverse utility matrices, which can be designed for specific tasks, ensuring its flexibility for different problem settings. In empirical evaluation, we design a new metric, False Head Rate, to quantify tail-sensitivity risk, along with comprehensive experiments on multiple real-world tasks, including large-scale image classification and uncertainty quantification, to demonstrate the reliability and flexibility of our method.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

In this paper, we propose DuaShepherd, a novel reward modeling framework that integrates two complementary reward signals, correctness and potential, to enhance the mathematical reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). While correctness-based signals emphasize identification of stepwise errors, potential-based signals focus on the likelihood of reaching the correct final answer. We developed an automated pipeline for constructing large-scale reward modeling dataset with both signals. A unified, multi-head architecture was explored to train the two reward models in a multi-task setup, demonstrating benefits from learning both correctness and potential in parallel. By combining these two signals into a compound probability, our model achieves consistent performance improvements across multiple benchmarks. Empirical evaluations on MATH500 and ProcessBench confirm that this combined reward significantly outperforms models trained on either reward type alone, achieving state-of-the-art performance under comparable resource constraints.

We propose Strategy-aware Surprise (SuS), a novel intrinsic motivation framework that uses pre-post prediction mismatch as a novelty signal for exploration in reinforcement learning. Unlike traditional curiosity-driven methods that rely solely on state prediction error, SuS introduces two complementary components: Strategy Stability (SS) and Strategy Surprise (SuS). SS measures consistency in behavioral strategy across temporal steps, while SuS captures unexpected outcomes relative to the agent's current strategy representation. Our combined reward formulation leverages both signals through learned weighting coefficients. We evaluate SuS on mathematical reasoning tasks using large language models, demonstrating significant improvements in both accuracy and solution diversity. Ablation studies confirm that removing either component results in at least 10% performance degradation, validating the synergistic nature of our approach. SuS achieves 17.4% improvement in Pass@1 and 26.4% improvement in Pass@5 compared to baseline methods, while maintaining higher strategy diversity throughout training.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Previous methods evaluate reward models by testing them on a fixed pairwise ranking test set, but they typically do not provide performance information on each preference dimension. In this work, we address the evaluation challenge of reward models by probing preference representations. To confirm the effectiveness of this evaluation method, we construct a Multi-dimensional Reward Model Benchmark (MRMBench), a collection of six probing tasks for different preference dimensions. We design it to favor and encourage reward models that better capture preferences across different dimensions. Furthermore, we introduce an analysis method, inference-time probing, which identifies the dimensions used during the reward prediction and enhances its interpretability. Through extensive experiments, we find that MRMBench strongly correlates with the alignment performance of large language models (LLMs), making it a reliable reference for developing advanced reward models. Our analysis of MRMBench evaluation results reveals that reward models often struggle to capture preferences across multiple dimensions, highlighting the potential of multi-objective optimization in reward modeling. Additionally, our findings show that the proposed inference-time probing method offers a reliable metric for assessing the confidence of reward predictions, which ultimately improves the alignment of LLMs.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is effective for training large language models on deterministic outcome reasoning tasks. Prior work shows RLVR works with few prompts, but prompt selection is often based only on training-accuracy variance, leading to unstable optimization directions and weaker transfer. We revisit prompt selection from a mechanism-level view and argue that an effective minibatch should provide both (i) a reliable positive anchor and (ii) explicit negative learning signals from rare failures. Based on this principle, we propose positive--negative pairing: at each update, we sample a hard-but-solvable q^{+} and an easy-but-brittle prompt q^{-}(high success rate but not perfect), characterized by low and high empirical success rates under multiple rollouts. We further introduce Weighted GRPO, which reweights binary outcomes at the pair level and uses group-normalized advantages to amplify rare successes on q^{+} into sharp positive guidance while turning rare failures on q^{-} into strong negative penalties. This bidirectional signal provides informative learning feedback for both successes and failures, improving sample efficiency without suppressing exploration. On Qwen2.5-Math-7B, a single paired minibatch per update consistently outperforms a GRPO baseline that selects two prompts via commonly used variance-based selection heuristics: AIME~2025 Pass@8 improves from 16.8 to 22.2, and AMC23 Pass@64 from 94.0 to 97.0, while remaining competitive with large-scale RLVR trained from a pool of 1209 training prompts. Similar gains are observed on Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct.

While foundation models have been exploited for various expert tasks through fine-tuning, any foundation model will become outdated due to its old knowledge or limited capability. Thus the underlying foundation model should be eventually replaced by new ones, which leads to repeated cost of fine-tuning these new models. Existing work addresses this problem by inference-time tuning, i.e., modifying the output probabilities from the new foundation model with the outputs from the old foundation model and its fine-tuned model, which involves an additional overhead in inference by the latter two models. In this paper, we propose a new fine-tuning principle, Portable Reward Tuning (PRT), that reduces the inference overhead by its nature, based on the reformulation of fine-tuning as the reward maximization. Specifically, instead of fine-tuning parameters of the foundation models, PRT trains the reward model explicitly through the same loss function as in fine-tuning. During inference, the reward model can be used with any foundation model (with the same set of vocabularies or labels) through the formulation of reward maximization. Experimental results, covering both vision and language models, demonstrate that the PRT-trained model can achieve comparable accuracy to the existing work of inference-time tuning, with less inference cost.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) for large language models (LLMs) has achieved remarkable progress in enhancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities on tasks with clear correctness criteria, such as mathematical reasoning tasks. Several training metrics, such as entropy or response length, have been observed to correlate with different reasoning behaviors in reinforcement learning. Prior approaches incorporate such priors through reward or advantage shaping, which often relies on hand-crafted penalties and preferences (e.g., higher-is-better or lower-is-better). However, without careful hyperparameter tuning, these directional priors can be overly biased and may lead to failure. To this end, we introduce Conditional advANtage estimatiON (CANON), amplifying the impact of the target metric without presuming its direction. Specifically, CANON regroups the sampled responses into two groups based on the higher or lower value of a target metric, measures which metric trend contributes to better performance through inter-group comparison, and identifies the better response within the same group. In summary, CANON based on entropy consistently outperforms prior methods across three LLMs on both math reasoning and high-complexity logic tasks. When applied to response length, CANON further improves token efficiency, yielding a more favorable Pareto frontier in the performance-cost trade-off.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Post-training alignment of video generation models with human preferences is a critical goal. Developing effective Reward Models (RMs) for this process faces significant methodological hurdles. Current data collection paradigms, reliant on in-prompt pairwise annotations, suffer from labeling noise. Concurrently, the architectural design of VLM-based RMs, particularly their output mechanisms, remains underexplored. Furthermore, RM is susceptible to reward hacking in post-training. To mitigate these limitations, we propose SoliReward, a systematic framework for video RM training. Our framework first sources high-quality, cost-efficient data via single-item binary annotations, then constructs preference pairs using a cross-prompt pairing strategy. Architecturally, we employ a Hierarchical Progressive Query Attention mechanism to enhance feature aggregation. Finally, we introduce a modified BT loss that explicitly accommodates win-tie scenarios. This approach regularizes the RM's score distribution for positive samples, providing more nuanced preference signals to alleviate over-focus on a small number of top-scoring samples. Our approach is validated on benchmarks evaluating physical plausibility, subject deformity, and semantic alignment, demonstrating improvements in direct RM evaluation metrics and in the efficacy of post-training on video generation models. Code and benchmark will be publicly available.

We present a complete theoretical characterization of Latent Posterior Factors (LPF), a principled framework for aggregating multiple heterogeneous evidence items in probabilistic prediction tasks. Multi-evidence reasoning arises pervasively in high-stakes domains including healthcare diagnosis, financial risk assessment, legal case analysis, and regulatory compliance, yet existing approaches either lack formal guarantees or fail to handle multi-evidence scenarios architecturally. LPF encodes each evidence item into a Gaussian latent posterior via a variational autoencoder, converting posteriors to soft factors through Monte Carlo marginalization, and aggregating factors via exact Sum-Product Network inference (LPF-SPN) or a learned neural aggregator (LPF-Learned). We prove seven formal guarantees spanning the key desiderata for trustworthy AI: Calibration Preservation (ECE <= epsilon + C/sqrt(K_eff)); Monte Carlo Error decaying as O(1/sqrt(M)); a non-vacuous PAC-Bayes bound with train-test gap of 0.0085 at N=4200; operation within 1.12x of the information-theoretic lower bound; graceful degradation as O(epsilon*delta*sqrt(K)) under corruption, maintaining 88% performance with half of evidence adversarially replaced; O(1/sqrt(K)) calibration decay with R^2=0.849; and exact epistemic-aleatoric uncertainty decomposition with error below 0.002%. All theorems are empirically validated on controlled datasets spanning up to 4,200 training examples. Our theoretical framework establishes LPF as a foundation for trustworthy multi-evidence AI in safety-critical applications.

We utilize an offline reinforcement learning (RL) model for sequential targeted promotion in the presence of budget constraints in a real-world business environment. In our application, the mobile app aims to boost customer retention by sending cash bonuses to customers and control the costs of such cash bonuses during each time period. To achieve the multi-task goal, we propose the Budget Constrained Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Promotion (BCRLSP) framework to determine the value of cash bonuses to be sent to users. We first find out the target policy and the associated Q-values that maximizes the user retention rate using an RL model. A linear programming (LP) model is then added to satisfy the constraints of promotion costs. We solve the LP problem by maximizing the Q-values of actions learned from the RL model given the budget constraints. During deployment, we combine the offline RL model with the LP model to generate a robust policy under the budget constraints. Using both online and offline experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by showing that BCRLSP achieves a higher long-term customer retention rate and a lower cost than various baselines. Taking advantage of the near real-time cost control method, the proposed framework can easily adapt to data with a noisy behavioral policy and/or meet flexible budget constraints.

We present extensive empirical evidence showing that current Bayesian simulation-based inference algorithms can produce computationally unfaithful posterior approximations. Our results show that all benchmarked algorithms -- (Sequential) Neural Posterior Estimation, (Sequential) Neural Ratio Estimation, Sequential Neural Likelihood and variants of Approximate Bayesian Computation -- can yield overconfident posterior approximations, which makes them unreliable for scientific use cases and falsificationist inquiry. Failing to address this issue may reduce the range of applicability of simulation-based inference. For this reason, we argue that research efforts should be made towards theoretical and methodological developments of conservative approximate inference algorithms and present research directions towards this objective. In this regard, we show empirical evidence that ensembling posterior surrogates provides more reliable approximations and mitigates the issue.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of `decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the `embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

The performance of many machine learning models depends on their hyper-parameter settings. Bayesian Optimization has become a successful tool for hyper-parameter optimization of machine learning algorithms, which aims to identify optimal hyper-parameters during an iterative sequential process. However, most of the Bayesian Optimization algorithms are designed to select models for effectiveness only and ignore the important issue of model training efficiency. Given that both model effectiveness and training time are important for real-world applications, models selected for effectiveness may not meet the strict training time requirements necessary to deploy in a production environment. In this work, we present a unified Bayesian Optimization framework for jointly optimizing models for both prediction effectiveness and training efficiency. We propose an objective that captures the tradeoff between these two metrics and demonstrate how we can jointly optimize them in a principled Bayesian Optimization framework. Experiments on model selection for recommendation tasks indicate models selected this way significantly improves model training efficiency while maintaining strong effectiveness as compared to state-of-the-art Bayesian Optimization algorithms.

Reliable hypothesis testing is the foundation of many empirical scientific claims. Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly used to automate this process, as they can inspect datasets, generate code, and produce analyses end-to-end. However, we show that they frequently make subtle inferential errors that lead to incorrect conclusions despite correctly executed analyses. Existing benchmarks fail to capture this failure mode, as they rarely assess whether a reported p-value is statistically valid given the assumptions underlying the data. We address this gap by building P-Bench, a benchmark comprising 425 open-ended, realistic hypothesis-testing tasks spanning economics, biology, and medicine. Each task requires an agent to select a statistical method, compute a p-value, and draw a conclusion given only a scientific hypothesis and a dataset. We further introduce Fisher-R1, an open-weight LLM agent trained for rigorous hypothesis testing using synthetic tasks and reinforcement learning. On P-Bench, Fisher-R1-14B substantially improves over its backbone and outperforms strong proprietary and open-source baselines, including GPT-5.4 and DeepSeekV4-Pro, achieving a 21% average relative improvement in single-trial success over DeepSeek-V4-Pro, with gains up to 26% on the most challenging tasks. Our results demonstrate that current LLM agents lack reliable statistical reasoning for hypothesis testing and that reinforcement learning on tasks with verified statistical reward substantially improves reliability.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has emerged as a powerful paradigm for training intelligent agents. However, existing methods typically employ binary rewards that fail to capture quality differences among trajectories achieving identical outcomes, thereby overlooking potential diversity within the solution space. Inspired by the ``sweet spot'' concept in tennis-the racket's core region that produces optimal hitting effects, we introduce Sweet Spot Learning (SSL), a novel framework that provides differentiated guidance for agent optimization. SSL follows a simple yet effective principle: progressively amplified, tiered rewards guide policies toward the sweet-spot region of the solution space. This principle naturally adapts across diverse tasks: visual perception tasks leverage distance-tiered modeling to reward proximity, while complex reasoning tasks reward incremental progress toward promising solutions. We theoretically demonstrate that SSL preserves optimal solution ordering and enhances the gradient signal-to-noise ratio, thereby fostering more directed optimization. Extensive experiments across GUI perception, short/long-term planning, and complex reasoning tasks show consistent improvements over strong baselines on 12 benchmarks, achieving up to 2.5X sample efficiency gains and effective cross-task transferability. Our work establishes SSL as a general principle for training capable and robust agents.

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning have made significant strides in performance on applications such as Go and Atari games. However, developing practical methods to balance exploration and exploitation in complex domains remains largely unsolved. Thompson Sampling and its extension to reinforcement learning provide an elegant approach to exploration that only requires access to posterior samples of the model. At the same time, advances in approximate Bayesian methods have made posterior approximation for flexible neural network models practical. Thus, it is attractive to consider approximate Bayesian neural networks in a Thompson Sampling framework. To understand the impact of using an approximate posterior on Thompson Sampling, we benchmark well-established and recently developed methods for approximate posterior sampling combined with Thompson Sampling over a series of contextual bandit problems. We found that many approaches that have been successful in the supervised learning setting underperformed in the sequential decision-making scenario. In particular, we highlight the challenge of adapting slowly converging uncertainty estimates to the online setting.

As agents based on large language models are increasingly deployed to long-horizon tasks, maintaining their alignment with stakeholder preferences becomes critical. Effective alignment in such settings requires reward models that are interpretable so that stakeholders can understand and audit model objectives. Moreover, reward models must be capable of steering agents at interaction time, allowing preference shifts to be incorporated without retraining. We introduce ARCANE, a framework that frames alignment as a multi-agent collaboration problem that dynamically represents stakeholder preferences as natural-language rubrics: weighted sets of verifiable criteria that can be generated on-the-fly from task context. Inspired by utility theory, we formulate rubric learning as a reconstruction problem and apply a regularized Group-Sequence Policy Optimization (GSPO) procedure that balances interpretability, faithfulness, and computational efficiency. Using a corpus of 219 labeled rubrics derived from the GDPVal benchmark, we evaluate ARCANE on challenging tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and tool use. The learned rubrics produce compact, legible evaluations and enable configurable trade-offs (e.g., correctness vs. conciseness) without retraining. Our results show that rubric-based reward models offer a promising path toward interpretable, test-time adaptive alignment for complex, long-horizon AI systems.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task objective. This gives rise to the agent alignment problem: how do we create agents that behave in accordance with the user's intentions? We outline a high-level research direction to solve the agent alignment problem centered around reward modeling: learning a reward function from interaction with the user and optimizing the learned reward function with reinforcement learning. We discuss the key challenges we expect to face when scaling reward modeling to complex and general domains, concrete approaches to mitigate these challenges, and ways to establish trust in the resulting agents.

Predicting click and conversion probabilities when bidding on ad exchanges is at the core of the programmatic advertising industry. Two separated lines of previous works respectively address i) the prediction of user conversion probability and ii) the attribution of these conversions to advertising events (such as clicks) after the fact. We argue that attribution modeling improves the efficiency of the bidding policy in the context of performance advertising. Firstly we explain the inefficiency of the standard bidding policy with respect to attribution. Secondly we learn and utilize an attribution model in the bidder itself and show how it modifies the average bid after a click. Finally we produce evidence of the effectiveness of the proposed method on both offline and online experiments with data spanning several weeks of real traffic from Criteo, a leader in performance advertising.

Memory-based meta-learning is a powerful technique to build agents that adapt fast to any task within a target distribution. A previous theoretical study has argued that this remarkable performance is because the meta-training protocol incentivises agents to behave Bayes-optimally. We empirically investigate this claim on a number of prediction and bandit tasks. Inspired by ideas from theoretical computer science, we show that meta-learned and Bayes-optimal agents not only behave alike, but they even share a similar computational structure, in the sense that one agent system can approximately simulate the other. Furthermore, we show that Bayes-optimal agents are fixed points of the meta-learning dynamics. Our results suggest that memory-based meta-learning might serve as a general technique for numerically approximating Bayes-optimal agents - that is, even for task distributions for which we currently don't possess tractable models.